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Abstract: The EU has been promoting unbundling of the transmission grid from other stages 
of the electricity supply chain with the aim of fostering competition in the upstream stage of 
electricity generation. At presence, ownership unbundling is the predominant form of 
unbundling in Europe. However, the benefits of increased competition from ownership 
unbundling of the transmission grid may come at the cost of lost vertical synergies between the 
formerly integrated stages of electricity supply. The policy debate generally neglects such 
potential costs of unbundling, yet concentrates on its benefits. Therefore European cross-
country evidence may shed some light on this issue. This study helps fill this void by 
empirically estimating the magnitude of economies of vertical integration (EVI) between 
electricity generation and transmission based on a quadratic cost function. For this purpose 
we employ novel firm-level panel data of major European electricity utilities. Our results 
confirm the presence of substantial EVI, which put the policy measure of transmission 
ownership unbundling into question. 
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1. Introduction 
Before the introduction of liberalization and regulatory reforms, in order to promote 
competition in the European electricity sector, electricity utilities were generally regarded as 
natural monopolies. Electricity is a particularly special good which includes some important 
characteristics: (i) On a large scale, electricity cannot be easily stored, which requires supply 
to meet demand at all times. Therefore, suppliers need to have sufficient excess capacities to 
meet peak demand. (ii) Electricity follows physical laws (Ohm’s and Kirchoff’s laws) and 
flows its way of least resistance. (iii) Generated electricity has to be transported to customers 
via long-distance high-voltage transmission lines and locally via lower-voltage distribution 
lines. (Arocena et al., 2012; Ramos-Real, 2005) Under these conditions, the supply of 
electricity is highly interlinked along the various supply stages and, henceforth, subject to 
coordination requirements (Gugler et al., 2013). 
In the classical fashion, vertical integration of upstream and downstream operations was the 
predominant organizational form of an electricity utility to benefit from scope economies of 
vertical integration. A fully vertically integrated electricity company would encompass all 
stages from electricity generation, over high-voltage transmission of electricity, to local 
distribution, in conjunction with system operations, retailing to final consumers, and 
wholesale power procurement (e.g. Hunt, 2002). It seems natural that vertical integration 
exhibits cost savings through coordination advantages, sharing of information, use of common 
inputs, sharing of staff, efficient planning of investments, protection against uncertainty and 
financial risk, among other factors, which cannot be easily realized by unbundled firms (Jara-
Díaz et al., 2004; Meyer, 2012). Henceforth, vertical integration seems to be a more efficient 
organizational form compared to leaving the coordination of the vertical supply to the market. 
(Arocena et al., 2012) 
In recent decades, the unbundling principle (i.e. vertical separation) has been put into practice 
in many economies around the globe. This regulatory measure has the aim to isolate some 
segments of the electricity supply chain, which do not exhibit the usual properties of a natural 
monopoly (e.g. generation, retails), for the sake of eliminating anti-competitive forces and 
lowering the electricity price for end-consumers through increased competition (Fraquelli et 
al., 2005). The remaining segments – the transmission grid and the distribution lines – feature 
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typical network characteristics associated with a natural monopoly and, thus, need to be 
regulated.1 
However, a controversial debate has arisen whether the benefits of increased competition may 
be offset by potentially increased costs of utilities from unbundling.2 The policy discussion 
has put little attention to the fact that the regulatory measure of vertical disintegration comes 
at a cost, namely the destruction of vertical economies. According to Meyer (2012a) the 
greatest vertical synergies occur between generation and transmission, for which the largest 
cost savings are to be expected. Against this background, it is relevant to assess if and how 
large these vertical economies may be. Most of all, it is important to consider these potential 
costs of unbundling in the policy debate. 
Indeed, the European Union has already put vertical disintegration of the high-voltage 
transmission grid into practice (starting with to the EU directive 1996/92/EC; Schmitt and 
Kucera, 2013).3 Therefore, vertical structures of electricity utilities have been broken up, and 
simultaneously, third party access to the transmission grid has been granted for entrants. The 
most recent EU directive 2009/72/EC requires its Member States to choose from three 
different forms of vertical unbundling of the transmission grid: (i) full ownership unbundling 
(the predominant form in Europe), (ii) the implementation of an independent system operator 
(ISO), or (iii) the implementation of an independent transmission operator (ITO).4 Among 
them, ownership unbundling represents the most restrictive type, where vertically integrated 
electricity utilities have to fully separate from their transmission grid. Hence, with ownership 
unbundling it is possible to detect the new transmission operator as an own firm in the data, 
while the previously integrated firm loses its transmission network. 
While the empirical literature in general finds considerable cost savings from vertical 
economies for US electricity utilities, limited empirical literature on single-country studies 
points toward modest cost savings in Europe. In brief, empirical evidence questions the 
effectiveness of the divestiture of integrated utilities in the electricity industry, whereby 
evidence from Europe is scarce and not as distinctive as from the US. Noticeably, not only the 
regulatory framework but also the structure of the electricity industry differ between the US 
and Europe in many respects, which makes a direct comparison difficult (Meyer, 2012a). 
                                                            
1 For example, by introducing price regulation (grid tariffs) and third party access. 
2 Sappington (2008) discusses the benefits of vertical divestiture to maximize consumer welfare despite the 
presence of substantial vertical economies. Gugler et al. (2013) show that there is a trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiency in this context. 
3 Contrary, the level of unbundling of distribution lines lags far behind. 
4 Balmert and Brunekreeft (2010) provide a description of the various forms of transmission unbundling. 
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Moreover, the predominant share of the literature concentrates on the estimation of scope 
economies between the stages of generation and distribution, for which data seem to be easier 
available. Contrary, there is hardly evidence on cost savings from integration between 
generation and transmission. Since the EU law explicitly requires unbundling of the 
transmission grid, such information would be of utmost relevance and promotes one decisive 
feature of this study. 
We, therefore, concentrate on the efficiency and effectiveness of vertical divestiture of the 
supply stages of generation and transmission of European electricity utilities. To achieve this 
goal, we quantify vertical scope economies based on the estimation of a multistage quadratic 
cost function. If vertical economies were found to be large, it would indicate that the 
regulatory measure of ownership unbundling of the transmission grid may come at substantial 
costs. 
We utilize novel firm-level data on 28 major European electricity utilities from 16 European 
countries for the annual date for the period 2000–2010. Data are collected from annual reports 
and combined with data sources from Platts, Orbis, Worldscope, and OECD. To the best of 
our knowledge, the paper is the first to provide empirical cross-country evidence for Europe 
regarding economies of scope from vertical integration in the electricity sector. A key benefit 
of this study is its focus on generation versus transmission, while most of the remainder 
literature has concentrated on generation versus distribution. The data allow for exploiting 
vertical economies through mixed company structures, since the sample represents all 
organizational forms of generators, transmitters, and vertically integrated utilities. 
Against this background, this analysis tries to shed some light on the consequences of 
transmission unbundling as a regulatory means. This is of particular interest not only for 
regulatory authorities and policy-makers, which are concerned with the optimal form of 
regulation, but also for end-consumers who eventually have to finance the electricity system 
via electricity taxes and (higher) prices. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of the relevant literature 
about scope economies in the electricity sector. Section 3 describes the theory on scope 
economies and their potential sources. The model specification and estimation strategy are 
presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the underlying data for the econometric analysis. 
The results are provided in Section 6, where we present not only regression results and 
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robustness checks but also the quantification of scope economies for different firm 
dimensions. Section 7 concludes the findings and derives policy implications. 
 
2. Review of relevant empirical literature on vertical economies in electricity 
The main body of the empirical literature on vertical economies in the electricity sector 
investigates the stages of generation and the network, where the latter is either represented by 
the distribution network or a combination of the distribution and the transmission network. 
Some early works have concentrated on the separability and sub-additivity of the vertical 
supply stages in the electricity sector (e.g. Gilsdorf, 1994; Hayashi et al. 1997; Lee, 1995; 
Roberts, 1986; Thompson, 1997). The findings generally indicate non-separability of the cost 
function, 5  which point toward the presence of vertical scope economies. Subsequently, 
empirical studies have started to directly implement the concept of multi-output theory with 
the primary appeal to estimate the magnitude of vertical synergies in the electricity markets. 
Both, Arocena et al. (2010) and Ramos-Real (2005) provide thorough literature reviews. In 
the following, we discuss the relevant literature on vertical cost synergies at the US and 
European electricity sectors. Thereby we put emphasis on the stages of generation and 
distribution, as well as generation and transmission, respectively. 
A great deal of the empirical nexus on scope economies from vertical integration between 
generation and distribution focuses on the US. A seminal contribution has been the article by 
Kaserman and Mayo (1991), who apply a quadratic cost function and estimate 12 percent cost 
savings at the sample mean for 74 US electricity companies in 1981. Hayashi et al. (1997) 
focus on 50 US utilities with at least 85 percent of generation from fossil fuels for the period 
1983–1987 and apply a translog cost function. The results show vertical economies of around 
17 percent for the average utility (a sample split into small and large utilities shows evidence 
of vertical economies of 14 percent and 17 percent, respectively). Kwoka (2002) examines 
data on 147 US utilities for the year 1989 and finds substantial vertical economies based on a 
quadratic cost function. While for very small utilities stand alone production is a viable 
strategy, larger companies do profit from cost savings from vertical integration. At the median 
and mean level, scope economies are calculated at 27 and 42 percent respectively. Greer 
(2008) utilizes a sample of 831 US rural utilities in 1997. Estimates from a modified quadratic 
cost function reveal cost savings from vertical integration for basically all utilities. Similar to 
                                                            
5 Non-separabilitiy of the cost function means that downstream activities of transmission and distribution are 
dependent on upstream generation. 
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Kwoka’s (2002) findings, economies of scope for the average utility are in the order of 40 
percent. 
Triebs et al. (2012) apply a flexible approach of the cost function by allowing for differences 
in technologies across integrated and specialized firms. Their results from an unbalanced 
panel of US utilities for the period 2000–2003 indicate moderate scope economies of 4.4 
percent, putting previous findings into perspective. Arocena et al. (2012) incorporate data on 
116 US investor owned utilities for the year 2001 and estimate a quadratic cost function. 
Vertical economies are estimated in the scope of eight percent, while horizontal economies 
(across different types of generation) make up around 5.5 percent for the average utility. 
In contradiction of the pronounced empirical literature on the US electricity industry, the 
European literature on multi-output cost-function estimation of vertical scope economies is 
relatively limited. To the best of our knowledge, merely single country studies but no cross-
country analysis exists. The Spanish electricity market has been investigated by Jara-Díaz et 
al. (2004), who employ an unbalanced panel of 12 Spanish electricity utilities for 1985–1996. 
The average firm in their sample exhibits vertical economies of 6.5 percent and horizontal 
economies of around ten percent. With regard to Italy, Fraquelli et al. (2005) make use of a 
composite cost function on 25 municipal electric utilities for the period 1994–2000 and 
estimate vertical cost savings of 3 percent. The same dataset is used by Piacenza and Vannoni 
(2004) 6  who compare estimates from different cost function specifications (generalized 
translog, standard translog, separable quadratic, composite, and general7). Their preferred 
model, the composite form, yields vertical economies in the magnitude of 6 percent for the 
median utility. Fetz and Filippini (2010) concentrate on the Swiss electricity sector. The 
estimation of a quadratic cost function of 74 utilities over 1997–2005 yields substantial 
vertical economies far beyond 40 percent on average.8 This may be explained by the relatively 
small size of the sample utilities having generally less than 100,000 customers. 
As far as we know, Meyer (2012a) is the only empirical study to investigate scope economies 
between electricity generation and transmission. Based on data from the US for the period 
2001–2008, his findings indicate modest vertical synergies between the two stages of 
approximately four percent for the average firm. This is explained by a coordination effect 
from transaction cost theory: “firm internal coordination is expected to be more efficient than 
                                                            
6 Contrasting to Fraquelli et al. (2005), Piacenza and Vannoni (2009) employ different output measures, with the 
purpose to investigate not only vertical but also horizontal economies at the distribution stage. 
7 The composite and general forms are implemented according to Pulley and Braunstein (1992). 
8 The exact magnitude of vertical economies for the mean or median utility is not provided in the paper. 
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market coordination as a result of costly, incomplete and/or inflexible contracts of market 
participants pursuing different or opposing interests.” (Meyer, 2012a, 105) Yet, Meyer warns 
against a potential bias of a comparison of his results with findings for Europe because of 
different market structures and initial unbundling conditions9. Besides, his results show the 
presence of vertical economies between generation and the whole network of transmission 
plus distribution of 19 to 26 percent and vertical economies between distribution (including 
retail) and generation plus transmission of eight to ten percent. 
Against this review of the empirical literature, vertical economies of scope in the electricity 
industry appear to exist, whereas contrasting findings regarding the magnitude of estimated 
cost savings from vertical integration may stem from different factors. Among them are: (i) 
the heterogeneity of utilities (e.g. size, corporate form, geographic region, regulatory 
framework) included in the data; (ii) the specification of the cost function; (iii) different 
measures of outputs and inputs; and (iv) diverging periods of observation. Some evidence 
from US electricity markets corroborates the presence of substantial cost savings from vertical 
integration. Clearly, vertical synergies in the European electricity sectors are under-
researched, foremost because only single countries have been investigated. Overall, the 
effectiveness of vertical ownership unbundling is being questioned despite its potential 
positive effects (e.g. increased competition, lower end-consumer prices). Since European 
cross-country scrutiny is missing, the purpose of this paper is to help fill this void in the 
literature. 
 
3. Multiproduct theory and sources of vertical economies 
The concept of economies of scope roots from the multiproduct production theory, based on 
the idea that there may be potential cost savings from jointly producing two outputs in 
contrast to separate production. Transaction theory provides the explanation that “firm 
internal coordination is expected to be more efficient than market coordination” (Meyer, 
2012a, 105). Consequently, the vertically integrated supply of upstream electricity generation 
and downstream electricity transmission may be cost efficient over a separated production 
process, as suggested by transmission ownership unbundling. Hence, vertical scope 
economies exist if the costs of separating the supply stages of generation ( ܻீ ) and 
transmission (்ܻ ) exceed their combined production costs: 
                                                            
9 In the US many states have implemented Regional Transmission Operators (RTO), which basically incorporate 
the role of European ISO.  
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ܥሺܻீ , 0ሻ ൅ ܥሺ0, ்ܻ ሻ െ ܥሺܻீ , ்ܻ ሻ ൐ 0. (1) 
The magnitude of economies of vertical integration (EVI) can be measured as the cost savings 
of jointly serving both stages relative to the costs of separated supply (Kwoka, 2002):  
ܧܸܫ ൌ ሾܥሺܻீ , 0ሻ ൅ ܥሺ0, ்ܻ ሻ െ ܥሺܻீ , ்ܻ ሻሿ/ሾܥሺܻீ , 0ሻ ൅ ܥሺ0, ்ܻ ሻሿ. (2) 
By exploiting vertical economies of scope, electricity utilities are able to obtain benefits for 
various reasons. In general, the complexity of the electricity sector and its interdependency 
among the different supply stages requires a high degree of coordination. In particular, 
integrated utilities may reduce their costs by coordinating dispatches of utilities’ plants 
according to the actual merit order10. Those vertical synergies may be lost with transmission 
unbundling and, hence, uncoordinated dispatches may shift costs closer to the more expensive 
reserve power. Besides optimizing economic dispatch of generating plants, Arocena et al. 
(2012) highlight coordination advantages from efficient plant investment, planning of 
maintenance schedules, maintenance of spinning reserves11, and risk management. 
Additionally, Baumol et al. (1982) point out that firms may save on costs by sharing common 
inputs among different stages of operations. It is most likely that electricity utilities may 
reduce costs by sharing capital and labor among the supply stages generation and 
transmission. Additionally, coordination advantages may arise due to technological 
interdependency of the operational stages of electricity supply (Gugler et al., 2013). 
Immediate coordination is required in so far as demand has to meet supply at all times. For 
this instance, the operational stages of electricity supply are interdependent and require 
informational transactions. “Since the strongest interaction occurs between generation and 
transmission, one would expect the most significant synergies between these stages.” (Meyer, 
2012a, 97) Other synergies may stem from sharing common production or maintenance tasks, 
and from the common usage of buildings, administrative staff, or IT software. Another source 
of vertical synergies may arise from efficient planning of investments by sharing accurate 
information among the various operational stages. Given these possibilities for attaining 
                                                            
10 In order to ensure equality of electricity supply when demand is declining, electricity plants may be dispatched 
from the network according to the merit order, which represents the short-term supply curve of electricity 
production based on ascending order of power plants’ marginal costs. 
11 The spinning reserve is the capacity reserve provided by the generating units actually connected to the power 
grid. In contrast, generating units not connected to the grid contribute to the non-spinning reserve. 
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vertical economies of integration, their loss from ownership unbundling of the transmission 
grid may increase the costs of utilities substantially.12 
 
4. Model specification and estimation strategy 
This study incorporates the quadratic specification of the cost function, which has been 
introduced by Baumol et al. (1982) and has been widely applied since for estimating scope 
economies in electricity markets. It provides several advantages over other specifications. 
Firstly, the quadratic is regarded as relevant for the estimation of cost savings from vertical 
integration (Farsi et al., 2008; Farsi and Filippini, 2004). Secondly, compared to the translog 
cost function, the quadratic readily handles the zero-values problem (Jara-Díaz et al., 2004). 
In the case of estimating vertical scope economies, this problem becomes particularly severe 
because, by definition, specialized production of one output requires zero values for the other 
output(s).13 Thirdly, given its prevalent application, results obtained from a quadratic cost 
function allow for a direct comparison with other studies (Meyer, 2012). In contrast, the 
quadratic cost function represents a second order Taylor approximation of its true unknown 
form. Hence, its corners may be poorly estimated and should be interpreted with caution.14 
It is of importance to highlight that many other empirical studies on economies of vertical 
integration, base their analyses on the estimation of a reduced form of the full specification of 
the cost function and/or do not impose all relevant restrictions (Farsi and Filippini, 2004; Fetz 
and Filippini, 2010; Kwoka, 2002; Meyer, 2012; Nemoto and Goto, 2004). The large 
estimates of cost synergies in previous papers (as mentioned in Section 2) may partly arise 
because “the cost function is not completely specified, as the input cost-share equations are 
not estimated together with the cost equation, many price interaction terms are excluded, and 
linear homogeneity restrictions are not imposed” (Arocena et al., 2012, 439). 
                                                            
12 Notwithstanding the synergy losses associated with vertical divestiture, Meyer (2012b) argues that firms 
subject to ownership unbundling would restructure their organizational form in order to obtain specialization 
advantages. 
13 Pulley and Braunstein (1992, 223) mention that “(…) the estimated translog cost function cannot be used to 
measure the costs of specialized production, as is required to estimate economies of scope or product-specific 
economies of scale.” Even though some studies (e.g. Hayashi et al., 1997) try to overcome this dilemma by 
replacing zero values by an arbitrarily small value, Triebs et al. (2012) argue that such estimates of scope 
economies may suffer from significant bias. Other functional forms, for example the composite cost function, 
allow for zero values in outputs (Fraquelli et al., 2005) but bear disadvantages, such as highly non-linear 
parameters and no economic meaning of coefficients (Triebs et al., 2012). 
14 We will come back to this issue in Section 6.2, when we interpret the magnitude of EVI at large output 
combinations (e.g. near the 90th percentiles). 
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We, therefore, estimate the full specification of the cost function, which includes a full set of 
interaction terms between outputs and input prices: 
ܥ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙீ ൅ ߙ் ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ ௜ܻ௧௝௝ ൅ 0.5∑ ∑ ߚ௝௞ ௜ܻ௧௝ ௜ܻ௧௞௞௝ ൅ ∑ ߛ௟ݓ௜௧௟௟ ൅ 0.5∑ ∑ ߛ௟௠ݓ௜௧௟ ݓ௜௧௠௠௟ ൅
∑ ∑ ߜ௝௟ ௜ܻ௧௝ݓ௜௧௟௟௝ ൅ ߩᇱܼ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (3) 
The subscripts i and t stand for the utility and year, respectively. The dependent variable (ܥ) 
represents the total costs, ܻ includes measures for outputs, w stands for measures for input 
prices, Z is a set of cost shifting variables, and ε is the error term. The two outputs of 
generation and transmission are given by ݆ ൌ ሼܩ, ܶሽ, the three input prices of labor, capital, 
and fuel are given by ݈ ൌ ሼܮ, ܥ, ܨሽ. The constants for overall operations, generation-specific 
operations, and transmission-specific operations are represented by ߙ଴, ߙீ  and ߙ், 
respectively. 
The constant ߙ଴ represents the joint fixed costs of an integrated utility, which operates at both 
stages of generation and transmission. These may arise, for example, from the usage of 
common facilities or common staff. Kwoka (2002, 659) mentions that “ߙ଴ represents the costs 
of any indivisible input, costs that would be duplicated by separate production (…).” In 
contrast, ߙீ and ߙ் are fixed costs of stand-alone provision of the supply stages of generation 
and transmission, respectively. Of particular interest is the estimated parameter on the output 
interaction between generation and transmission, ߚீ். A negative sign indicates variable cost 
synergies associated with the joint operation of generation and transmission within one 
electricity utility relative to separated operations. 
Sheppard’s Lemma is applied in order to enhance the performance of the regression by 
estimating the cost function together with its input shares (Christensen and Green, 1976).15 
This imposes no additional parameters but increases the degrees of freedom of the model 
(Martínez-Budría et al., 2003). The input shares read as follows: 
డ஼೔೟
డ௪೔೟೗
ൌ ݔ௟ ൌ ߛ௟ ൅ ∑ ߛ௟௠ݓ௜௧௠௠ ൅ ∑ ߜ௝௟ ௜ܻ௧௝௝ ൅ ߝ௜௧௟  (4) 
where ݔ௟ represents the quantity of input ݈, and ߝ௟ is the corresponding error term.  
Moreover, we introduce several restrictions to meet the assumptions of a standard cost 
function. A well-behaved cost function assumes linear homogeneity in input prices, so that an 
                                                            
15  Note that it is necessary to drop the input share equation regarding the input price which is used for 
normalization of costs and input prices. 
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increase in input prices proportionally increases total costs. This condition is imposed by 
dividing total costs and input prices by an arbitrarily chosen input price.16 Furthermore, we 
assume symmetry for the ߚ and ߛ parameters, so that ߚ௝௞ ൌ ߚ௞௝ and ߛ௟௠ ൌ ߛ௠௟. Additionally, 
we assume cost minimization of utilities and that outputs and input prices are determined 
exogenously. This seems to be a valid assumption under the circumstance that “factor prices 
are determined in competitive markets or through regulation, while electricity output is 
determined by consumer demand.” (Arocena et al., 2012, 444) 
 
5. Data 
This analysis utilizes a novel dataset of European electricity utilities. We focus on major 
utilities in order to ensure some degree of homogeneity. Foremost, contrary to small 
operators, large utilities are more likely to incorporate a transmission grid, if vertically 
integrated. Data are collected from the firms’ annual reports and are combined with other 
sources (Platts, Orbis, Worldscope, OECD). Limitations on data availability of relevant 
variables eventually led to the utilization of data from 28 major European electricity utilities 
from 16 European countries for the period 2000–2010.  
 
Table 1. Sample statistics 
Description Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
TOTEX excl. purchased power (bnEUR) ܥ 242 7.36 11.88 0.12 57.90
Generation (TWh) ܻீ 242 74.80 136.85 0.00 669.00
Transmission (tKm) ்ܻ 242 9.80 21.65 0.00 100.69
Price of labor (tEUR/empl.) ݓ௅ 242 57.69 21.53 12.07 141.01
Price of natural gas (tEUR/GWh) ݓி 242 26.03 8.55 9.75 44.78
Price of capital (%) ݓ஼ 242 7.05 3.77 0.68 30.32
Hydro Capacity (%) ݄ݕ݀ 242 28.28 26.63 0.00 100.00
Nuclear Capacity (%) ݊ݑܿ 242 11.77 17.10 0.00 61.46
Binary indicator: generation only ߙீ 242 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
Binary indicator: transmission only ߙ் 242 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Notes: Obs. is observations, Std. Dev. is standard deviation, Min. is minimum, Max. is maximum, tEUR is thousand 
EUR, bn EUR is billion (10^9) EUR, tKM is thousand Km, TWh is thousand GWh. 
 
                                                            
16 In our case we divide costs and input prices by the price of fuel. 
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The utilities in our sample cover 74 percent in total load of their respective countries.17 Some 
missing values in the data emanate from a lack of information in the respective annual reports 
or from other data sources.18 Hence, the sample is structured as an unbalanced panel. When 
possible and reasonable, single missing observations were inter- or extrapolated. In total, the 
sample comprises 242 observations. Summary statistics for all variables employed in this 
analysis are provided in Table 1. The sample includes all organizational company structures 
of pure generators, pure transmission operators, and vertically integrated utilities. Appendix 
Table A1 provides an overview of the electricity utilities covered by the sample. 
 
5.1. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, total costs, represents the sum of capital and operating expenditures. 
One particular concern on the estimation of multistage cost functions is to avoid any potential 
double-counting of expenses for purchased electricity (e.g. Kwoka, 2002; Jara-Díaz et al., 
2004; Meyer, 2012). Consequently, expenditures for purchased electricity have to be excluded 
from the total costs of utilities, which obtain all or a part of their electricity from external 
sources. Kaserman and Mayo (1991) have neglected to subtract purchased powers from total 
costs in their seminal paper, and have consequently been largely criticized by successive 
works.19 Unfortunately, data on expenses on purchased power were largely not available. For 
that reason, we collected data on the amount of purchased power from annual reports of the 
utilities in our sample. The amount of purchased power was then multiplied by the spot 
market price of electricity, obtained from the European Energy Exchange for the respective 
years. This made it possible to exclude purchased power from total costs.20 
 
 
 
                                                            
17 The comparison is based on OECD data on total national load for the available period 2003–2010: 2003: 69%, 
2004: 70%, 2005: 79%, 2006: 76%, 2007: 75%, 2008: 74%, 2009: 76%, 2010: 74%; Switzerland was excluded 
because of missing data. 
18 Due to missing information regarding our output measures we were not able to include some important 
utilities like E.ON. 
19 See Kwoka (2002, 659f) for a discussion. 
20 To check for robustness, we ran all regressions presented in this paper without subtracting purchased power 
from total costs. Regression results hardly changed. This is especially true for the parameter of interest on the 
output interaction term (ߚீ்). Hence, the exclusion of purchased power seems less problematic in our analysis. 
One explanation may be that we focus on transmission unbundling, whereas the main body of the literature 
concentrates on distribution unbundling. 
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5.2. Output variables 
The upstream generation output is measured as the amount of electricity (in GWh) produced 
in Europe. Even though some utilities operate at the national level only, others possess 
generation plants across countries. If an electricity utility is found to operate overseas (outside 
Europe), it was generally possible to obtain the amount of electricity produced in Europe. 
We employ the length of the transmission grid (in kilometers) as a measure of the 
downstream transmission output. 21  This may seem controversial at first, but bears some 
advantages over a more conventional measure, such as transmitted volumes. Notably, the 
transmission grid is capital intensive and costs do not change with variations in transmitted 
volumes, in particular in the short run. Thus, contrary to transmitted volumes, the length of 
the transmission grid may be more accurate in capturing capital expenditures. Moreover, the 
length of the grid (besides other factors such as topography or underground cabling) is crucial 
for maintenance expenditures and thus may have an influence on operating expenditures. 
Another argument for measuring the transmission output variable in kilometers (rather than in 
GWh) is based on the fact that transmitted volumes may not be under the immediate control 
of transmission grid operators, while the lengths of the transmission lines are. Because of the 
laws of physics, electricity cannot be easily transmitted directly from one location to another, 
but rather flows through its way of least resistance – often via detours (called loop flows 22) 
which are not subject to utilities’ influence. 
 
5.3. Input price variables 
Among the input-price variables, we include the price of labor, the price of capital, and the 
price of fuel. The measurement of the price of labor is straightforward. It is calculated as the 
expenses on salaries per year divided by the number of employees and, thus, represents the 
average expenses per employee per year. The data are obtained from Worldscope and are 
supplemented and, in case of doubtful values, verified by data from Orbis or annual reports. 
For the calculation of the price of capital we face one caveat. Generally, the annual rental rate 
of capital would represent a plausible measure. Nevertheless, we do not have such 
information for our sample. Therefore, we approximate this variable by the interest 
                                                            
21 In the fashion of Triebs et al. (2012), we chose a single output measure (because of multi-collinearity issues) 
for the downstream transmission stage among several possibilities, such as transmission grid length, transmitted 
volumes, or peak grid-load. 
22 In general, loop flows play a minor role in the distribution network. 
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expenditures on long-term debt relative to long-term debt. Evidently, long-term debt 
represents the most important source of funds for a capital intensive industry like electricity.23 
The data come from Worldscope and are backed by Orbis und annual reports. 
The price of fossil fuel is approximated by the annual average national price of natural gas for 
industrial customers obtained from OECD.24 The utility’s respective gas price was taken from 
the country of its headquarter. This seems plausible because most utilities in the sample 
operate to a large scale at the national level. Similarly, other studies have included the price of 
fossil fuel, generally approximated by the price of natural gas (e.g. Martínez-Budría, 2003; 
Jara-Díaz et al., 2004). Apart from fossil sources, other generation technologies, such as 
nuclear energy, water or other renewables, have very low or even zero fuel costs.25 
 
5.4. Control variables 
We employ the share of hydro (݄ݕ݀) and the share of nuclear power (݊ݑܿ) in total installed 
capacity per utility obtained from Platts PowerVison, in order to control for different 
generation techniques. Hydro and nuclear power exhibit low marginal costs and are therefore 
likely to serve as cost shifters. We expect a negative impact on total costs. 
One decisive feature of this study is its sample of electricity utilities across European 
countries over time. Consequently, the panel structure allows employing fixed effects 
estimation in order to check for unobserved heterogeneity. Time fixed-effects are introduced 
to capture, for example, technological progress in the industry or other shocks such as demand 
variations (e.g. through the financial crisis) common to all utilities in the sample.  
Given the limited number of 242 observations, firm fixed-effects estimation for all 28 sample 
utilities does not work properly. Supposedly, firm fixed-effects impose too many parameters 
and, hence, many parameter estimates turn out statistically insignificant. Therefore, we 
include country fixed-effects to take up unobserved heterogeneity across the 16 countries in 
                                                            
23 In a similar vein, Kaserman and Mayo (1991) employ the yield to maturity on long-term bonds as their price 
of capital, and Triebs et al. (2012) also concentrate on long-term interest rates for calculating capital 
expenditures. 
24 Unfortunately, the gas price explicitly for electricity companies in the OECD database exhibited too many 
missing values and could therefore not be employed in this analysis. However, both variables (i.e. the gas price 
for industrial customers and for electricity companies) reveal a high correlation of 0.998. 
25 The OECD Observer states that “unlike for coal, oil and gas, the impact on final prices of nuclear energy is 
very limited because fuel costs account for only 5% of the production cost.”  (OECD Observer No. 249, May 
2005, http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/1595/Uranium_price_hike_.html, accessed 11 
June, 2014). 
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the sample. These capture, for example, different regulatory regimes, climate conditions, 
which may determine demand for electricity, topography, relevant for the costs of 
constructing and maintaining the transmission grid, or production possibilities (e.g. 
availability of rivers for hydro power plants).  
We also considered including other control variables, for example a measure of customer 
density. Nevertheless, this variable was not available. An approximation by the population 
density of the country of the firm’s headquarter seemed problematic. The population density 
is likely to be related to the output variables. Indeed, regressions reacted sensitive to the 
inclusion of this variable. 
 
5.5. General data issues 
Financial variables, such as the total costs, salaries, or debt are obtained either from 
Worldscope for utilities listed on a stock exchange or from Orbis if not listed. Both sources 
provide data at the firm level. Accordingly, all global activities are captured if a firm operates 
overseas. This bears problems, since our output variables are measured at the European 
level.26 For those utilities it was necessary to adjust their financial variables to European 
activities. Hence, we calculated the annual share of sales in Europe in total (global) sales for 
each firm that operated overseas and adjusted the financial variables accordingly. 
Another data issue concerns the product mix of our sample utilities. Many electricity 
companies do not only provide a single product (electricity) but also engage in other 
production segments, foremost gas (but also water, waste, etc.). In order to limit our study to 
the analysis of electricity, it was necessary to adjust for firms’ operations apart from 
electricity. Henceforth, we calculated the share of revenues from electricity in total revenues 
(i.e. revenues generated from the whole product mix) and corrected all financial variables and 
accordingly. Worldscope and Orbis provide their financial data on various operational 
segments (e.g. electricity). Moreover we checked for robustness with information from annual 
reports (and other external sources) when data were available. 
 
 
 
                                                            
26 Of course, this is equal to the national level for utilities operating only within one country. 
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6. Results 
This section provides regression estimates of the quadratic cost function as presented in 
Equation (2). Eventually, we utilize these estimates to quantify potential cost savings from 
vertical synergies between the stages of generation and transmission. Different specifications 
of the model are chosen and discussed against their appropriateness. 
 
6.1. Cost function estimation 
As presented in section 4, we impose linear homogeneity of the cost function and divide the 
costs and input prices by the price of fuel. Moreover, we apply Sheppard’s Lemma to enhance 
estimation efficiency and estimate Equation (3) together with the cost share equations (4). In 
order to meet the non-linear characteristics of our cost function and its input shares, we 
estimate a non-linear system of equations. Hence, contrary to many other studies, which 
employ a linear estimator of the cost function, we apply non-linear GLS estimation (NLSUR), 
“which is the non-linear counterpart of the Zellner’s iterated seemingly unrelated regression 
technique” (Fraquelli et al., 2005, p. 298). 
As stated in the previous section, a particular feature of this analysis is the possibility of 
estimating a panel regression with fixed effects. Because of degrees of freedom considerations 
(given the limited number of 242 observations), we apply 16 country fixed-effects instead of 
28 firm fixed-effects. Besides, we employ year fixed-effects. Country and year fixed-effects 
may capture unobserved regional (e.g. regulatory regimes, topography, production 
possibilities) and time heterogeneity (e.g. technological progress, demand shocks). This 
distinguishes our paper from many others.27 
Table 2 shows the regression results from different model specifications. The basic model 
(Model i) excludes fixed effects, while alternative specifications introduce time fixed-effects 
(Model ii) and country fixed-effects (Model iii). Both time and country fixed-effects are 
included in Model (iv).28 All regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. Evidently, 
the regression estimates are robust to different specifications. In line with our expectations, 
the introduction of additional fixed-effects leads to lower efficiency of the parameter 
                                                            
27 We refer to Greene (2001) who states that fixed-effects estimation with non-linear models is feasible. 
28 Given space limitations, the coefficient estimates of the fixed effects are not reported, but are available upon 
request. 
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estimates (i.e. decreased statistical significance of some point estimates) because of lower 
degrees of freedom, but increases the overall fit (R2). 
Most importantly, the coefficient estimate on the output interaction term ߚீ் is negative and 
statistically significant across specifications. Given the discussion provided in Section 4 this 
indicates the presence of variable scope economies between the stages of generation and 
transmission (i.e. cost complementarity). Hence, with larger combinations of both outputs (i.e. 
larger amount of electricity generated and longer length of transmission grid lines), electricity 
utilities can realize cost savings. Variable cost synergies are therefore dependent on the 
magnitude of the two outputs. In section 6.2 we will compute the economic significance of 
these potential savings. 
The overall constant (ߙ଴) is positive and significant (except in Model iv). This is an indication 
that there exist fixed costs of operation which are independent of the magnitude of the outputs 
produced. For an integrated utility these fixed costs occur only once, but would be duplicated 
in case of separated production (which applies to unbundled utilities). Henceforth, the larger 
	ߙ଴  the larger potential cost savings from integrated operations of generation and 
transmission. 
The parameter on stand-alone generation (ߙீ ) measures the fixed costs of stand-alone 
generation compared to integrated operation of generation and transmission. However, the 
point estimate is statistically insignificant and hence not to be distinguished from zero. The 
positive and significant coefficient value for the separate constant on stand-alone transmission 
(ߙ்ሻ, in contrast, indicates potential fixed-cost increases for stand-alone transmitters from a 
duplication of operational tasks compared to joint supply of generation and transmission. 
The full model specification including time and country fixed-effects (Model iv) provides 
robust parameter estimates compared to other specifications, yet suffers from a lower 
efficiency due to the high number of parameters imposed. The interesting parameter estimates 
on the fixed and variable cost synergies (ߙ଴, ߚீ், respectively) lose statistical significance. 
Nevertheless their point estimates are still in line with the other specifications, which estimate 
less parameters. 
Although not explicitly shown in Table 2, the coefficient estimates of the time fixed-effects 
are largely insignificant, with the exception of significantly negative impacts in the years 
2006 and 2007. In contrast, most country fixed-effects (10 out of 15 in Model iv) enter 
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statistically significant. This points to significant heterogeneity across European countries 
with respect to the costs of supplying electricity. 
 
6.2. Economies of vertical integration (EVI) 
The quantification of vertical economies follows Equation (2) and is based on estimates from 
the cost function. Economies of vertical integration reflect the cost savings of joint operation 
of electricity generation and transmission versus stand-alone operation. Specifically, we 
calculate the cost savings from joint operation at various output percentiles. Since the 
generation output is zero below the 20th percentile and the transmission output below the 50th 
percentile, vertical synergies can only be computed for output combinations above these 
thresholds. Independent variables (input prices and control variables) are evaluated at their 
mean values. To obtain significance levels, we test Equation (2) against zero based on a non-
linear Wald test.29 
Table 3 reports the magnitude of vertical synergies at different output levels according to 
equation (2) and based on the estimates from the preferred NLSUR Model iv (see Table 2), 
which includes the full set of fixed effects. To check for robustness, we computed economies 
of vertical integration based on all alternative specifications, as shown in Models i–iii in Table 
2. These results are provided in Table A2 in the appendix. All findings present similar values 
(except values at the corners; see footnote 30) indicating robustness to the specification of the 
cost function. 
                                                            
29 We use STATA’s command testnl. The p-values are based on the Delta-Method, which requires a large 
sample. Alternatively, we apply a linear test of Equation (1) against zero using STATA’s command lincom. The 
significance levels hardly change. 
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Table 2. Non-linear regression (NLSUR) estimates of the cost function 
  (i) Basic model (ii) Time FE (iii) Country FE (iv) Time & Country FE 
ߙ଴ 0.5852 (0.003) *** 0.9311 (0.002) *** 1.0088 (0.022) ** 0.8026 (0.109)ߙீ -0.1055 (0.591) 0.0385 (0.856) -0.2736 (0.127) -0.0071 (0.977)ߙ் 2.2536 (0.000) *** 2.2903 (0.000) *** 3.3830 (0.000) *** 3.2382 (0.000) *** ߚீ 0.0351 (0.000) *** 0.0333 (0.000) *** 0.0596 (0.000) *** 0.0585 (0.000) *** ߚ் -0.1502 (0.000) *** -0.1427 (0.000) *** -0.1318 (0.001) *** -0.1066 (0.011) ** ߚீீ 0.0001 (0.070) * 0.0002 (0.032) ** 0.0000 (0.926) 0.0000 (0.974)ߚ்் 0.0041 (0.001) *** 0.0038 (0.001) *** 0.0021 (0.064) * 0.0014 (0.219)ߚீ் -0.0006 (0.008) *** -0.0007 (0.003) *** -0.0007 (0.078) * -0.0008 (0.054) * ߛ௟ 0.1789 (0.000) *** 0.1858 (0.000) *** 0.1679 (0.000) *** 0.1760 (0.000) *** ߛ௖ 0.3116 (0.000) *** 0.3230 (0.000) *** 0.3092 (0.000) *** 0.3189 (0.000) *** ߛ௟௟ -0.0078 (0.359) -0.0110 (0.212) -0.0045 (0.592) -0.0085 (0.334)ߛ௖௖ -0.1309 (0.000) *** -0.1308 (0.000) *** -0.1407 (0.000) *** -0.1354 (0.000) *** ߛ௟௖ -0.0161 (0.001) *** -0.0211 (0.000) *** -0.0140 (0.007) ** -0.0191 (0.000) *** ߜீ௟ 0.0000 (0.745) 0.0000 (0.757) 0.0000 (0.630) 0.0000 (0.598)ߜீ௖ -0.0007 (0.000) *** -0.0007 (0.000) *** -0.0006 (0.000) *** -0.0006 (0.000) *** ߜ்௟ 0.0006 (0.153) 0.0006 (0.161) 0.0006 (0.138) 0.0005 (0.152)ߜ்௖ 0.0042 (0.000) *** 0.0042 (0.000) *** 0.0041 (0.000) *** 0.0042 (0.000) *** ݄ݕ݀ -0.0080 (0.002) *** -0.0067 (0.016) ** -0.0147 (0.037) ** -0.0100 (0.182)
݊ݑܿ -0.0063 (0.213)   -0.0053 (0.304)   0.0260 (0.189)   0.0252 (0.194)   
Time FE no yes no yes 
Country FE no     no     yes     yes     
Obs. 242 242 242 242 
Overall R2 0.883 0.891 0.928 0.936 
Notes: Dependent variable is total expenditures excluding purchased power; Robust p-values in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 3 confirms the presence of substantial vertical cost synergies for European electricity 
utilities. The median electricity utility in our sample (evaluated at median output levels of 
29,885 Gigawatt hours of generation and 658 kilometers of transmission lines) obtains cost 
savings from vertical integration of generation and transmission of around 13 percent relative 
to stand-alone operations. With larger output combinations, cost savings increase further. This 
is an indication that large electricity operators may benefit from higher economies of vertical 
integration. Yet, for very large output combinations, cost savings seem unrealistically high 
and should be viewed with caution.30 
 
Table 3. Magnitude of economies of vertical integration (EVI) based on Model iv 
Transmission 50th %ile: 60th %ile: 70th %ile: 80th %ile: 90th %ile: 
Generation GWh \ Km 658 3,657 6,713 11,000 33,580 
20th %ile: 2,569 16.4% ** 17.6% ** 19.0% ** 21.2% ** 39.4% *** 
30th %ile: 6,503 15.7% ** 17.0% ** 18.5% ** 20.8% ** 40.0% *** 
40th %ile: 12,869 14.7% ** 16.1% ** 17.8% ** 20.3% ** 40.7% *** 
50th %ile: 29,885 12.6% ** 14.3% ** 16.3% ** 19.3% ** 41.9% *** 
60th %ile: 52,100 10.6% * 12.7% ** 15.0% ** 18.5% ** 42.7% ** 
70th %ile: 62,126 10.0% * 12.1% ** 14.5% ** 18.2% ** 43.0% ** 
80th %ile: 90,785 8.4% * 10.9% ** 13.5% ** 17.5% ** 43.5% ** 
90th %ile: 179,000 5.9% * 8.8% ** 11.9% ** 16.5% ** 44.1% ** 
Notes: Calculation of EVI is based on Model iv, including time and country fixed effects. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Values below the 20th percentile 
of generation and 50th percentile of transmission are not reported because outputs have values of 
zero. Cells in grey indicate output combinations at equal percentiles.  
 
Overall, vertical economies are found to be statistically and economically significant. In 
general, this analysis shows that the regulatory principle of ownership unbundling of the 
transmission grid comes at substantial costs due to lost vertical synergies. This finding holds 
especially true for large electricity utilities which may obtain cost advantages of beyond 15 
percent. 
The results presented in this section should be somehow viewed with caution, because the 
magnitude of economies of vertical integration may represent an upper bound of their true 
values. In our sample, stand-alone transmission companies are rather under represented 
compared to other organization forms, and hence cost synergies may be somehow overstated. 
                                                            
30 The finding of large economies of scope near the corners of a cost function is quite common in the literature 
(e.g. Kwoka, 2002; Fraquelli et al., 2005; Fetz and Filippini, 2010). The reason is that the cost function as 
introduced in Equation (3) represents a Taylor approximation of the unknown true cost function. It may therefore 
only be suitable for estimation around the local minimum rather than near its corners. In our sample only one 
utility (i.e. EDF) exists in this scope. 
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Nevertheless, the results should be seen as an indication for the presence of substantial scope 
economies. 
It may be of interest to decompose the findings on the cost synergies between the stages of 
generation and transmission into a fixed and a variable component. As indicated in Section 4, 
the fixed costs of joint production, measured by the overall constant, ߙ଴, would be duplicated 
in case of vertical separation. In the Models i–iii, parameter estimates on ߙ଴ are statistically 
significant suggesting that vertical divestiture is associated with significantly increased fixed 
costs of separated operations. Nevertheless, with lower degrees of freedom (because of more 
parameters or lower number of observations; Models iv–viii) ߙ଴  becomes insignificant. 
Hence, the presence of fixed cost synergies can be only partly confirmed. 
However, the results provide strong evidence for the presence of variable cost synergies, 
given the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the output interaction term ߚீ் 
across specifications. Hence, variable cost effects are crucial for the exploitation of vertical 
economies between the stages of electricity generation and transmission. This is an indication 
that vertically integrated utilities may be able to internalize negative market externalities 
through better coordination. 
From those findings we can derive important policy implications. Countries with large 
vertically integrated electricity utilities prior to the implementation of ownership unbundling 
may suffer the most from vertical divestiture. To the contrary, countries with relatively small 
electricity companies may obtain economic benefits, such as non-discriminatory price 
competition in the upstream stage of generation, by introducing full ownership unbundling, 
while the associated losses from vertical economies may be of lesser importance.31 
 
  
                                                            
31 In this context, Meyer (2012b, 168) stresses that the actual degree of lost cost synergies from vertical 
divestiture largely hinges on the effectiveness of a newly created market mechanism that may overtake “firm 
internal coordination.” However, we cannot empirically test for this hypothesis. 
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7. Conclusion and policy implications 
The policy debate on transmission unbundling in Europe generally neglects the fact that the 
benefits of increased competition in the upstream stage of generation in the electricity sector 
come at the cost of destructing vertical synergies. One reason may be the absence of thorough 
empirical evidence for Europe. From this point, this analysis is, to the best of our knowledge, 
the first to provide European cross-country evidence on the costs of ownership unbundling of 
the transmission grid. 
The EU has already put unbundling of the transmission grid from other stages of electricity 
supply into practice. Member States may choose between full ownership unbundling and the 
implementation of an ISO or ITO, where the first is the predominant form in Europe. The 
reason for transmission unbundling is the hope of increased competitive pressure in the 
upstream stage of electricity generation, caused by a separation from the transmission stage, 
which is associated with a natural monopoly. However, the potentially positive effects of 
transmission unbundling may be compensated or even offset by lost synergy effects.  
Cost savings from vertical integration of generation and transmission are likely to arise from 
various effects. Among them are the common usage of inputs, such as capital and labor. 
Besides sharing of information and risk and coordination advantages are reasonable 
explanations for cost savings. Hence, ownership unbundling of generation and transmission 
may result in significantly higher costs for utilities in Europe. 
This study implements novel firm-level data on 28 major European electricity utilities from 
16 European countries over the period 2000–2010. Data emanate from annual reports as well 
as Worldscope, Orbis, Platts PowerVision, and OECD. One decisive feature of this paper is 
that the inclusion of (time and country) fixed-effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Based on the empirical estimation of a quadratic cost function, we quantify vertical 
economies of scope. Contrary to many other related studies, we introduce a fully specified 
cost function (including a full set of output and input price interaction terms) together with its 
input share equations (Sheppard’s Lemma) and all standard assumptions (i.e. linear 
homogeneity in input prices and symmetry in parameters). In order to meet the non-linearity 
characteristics of the system of equations, we apply a non-linear GLS estimator (NLSUR). 
The results of this analysis confirm that there exist substantial scope economies between the 
stages of upstream generation and downstream transmission in Europe. For the median firm in 
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our sample we find cost savings from vertical integration of around 13 percent. There are 
further potential cost savings to be generated at greater output levels. Therefore, larger 
operators may exhibit larger vertical economies in the scope of 15 to 20 percent. This may be 
explained by the fact that variable cost synergies are found to be economically and 
statistically significant across specifications. Additionally, there is some indication that fixed 
cost synergies are of relevance. In general, the results are robust to different specifications.  
Against the above, one policy implication may be that countries with large vertically 
integrated electricity operators are the ones which face the most severe costs of introducing 
ownership unbundling of the transmission grid. Therefore, such countries (e.g. France or 
Germany) which have not yet implemented transmission ownership unbundling, may be 
confronted with substantial costs by such a new policy. Given the high complexity of the 
electricity market and the interdependency of its supply stages introduces limitations to 
regulation (such as the implementation of the unbundling principle). Although we do not 
investigate this issue explicitly, there is some evidence that legal unbundling may serve as a 
reasonable compromise between the two extremes of vertical integration and full ownership 
unbundling (e.g. Höffler and Kranz, 2011; Pollitt, 2008). 
One should keep in mind that this analysis has a rather static focus because the data at hand 
do not allow for a proficient analysis of dynamic effects. Over time, cost increases may be 
partly compensated by positive dynamic effects of unbundling. 32  Besides, the estimated 
additional costs of ownership unbundling through lost vertical synergies cannot be easily 
compared with the benefits of increased competition and anti-monopolistic forces. This 
analysis represents, however, an important contribution to the literature and general debate on 
unbundling, as it provides evidence that transmission ownership unbundling comes at a cost, 
which has to be addressed in the policy debate. Overall, more empirical research on the costs 
and benefits of ownership unbundling is needed. Moreover, an empirical investigation of 
different unbundling regimes (e.g. legal vs ownership) would be of great interest. 
 
 
 
                                                            
32 Schober (2013) provides a comparison of static versus dynamic effects of distribution unbundling. His finds 
that negative static effects from ownership unbundling and third party access are eventually offset by positive 
dynamic effects. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Sample of electricity utilities 
utility Country Obs. Period  Organizational structure 
EVN Austria 11 2000-2010 G 
Verbund Austria 11 2000-2010 G&T 
Wiener Stadtwerke Austria 3 2008-2010 G 
CEZ Group Czech Rep. 11 2000-2010 G&T until 2002, then G 
Fortum Finland 10 2001-2010 G 
EDF France 11 2000-2010 G&T 
ENBW Germany 10 2001-2010 G&T 
RWE Germany 11 2000-2010 G&T 
Public Power Corp. Greece 11 2000-2010 G&T 
Magyar Villamos Hungary 7 2003-2010 G&T 
A2A Italy 7 2004-2010 G 
Acea Italy 11 2000-2010 G&T until 2005, then G 
Enel Italy 6 2005-2010 G 
IREN Italy 11 2000-2010 G&T 
Terna Italy 10 2001-2010 T 
Latvenergo Latvia 5 2006-2010 G&T 
Statkraft Norway 5 2006-2010 G 
Enea Poland 3 2008-2010 G 
PGE Polska Grupa Poland 3 2008-2010 G 
EDP Portugal 10 2001-2010 G&T 
Endesa Spain 11 2000-2010 G 
Iberdrola Spain 9 2002-2010 G 
Red Electrica Spain 8 2003-2010 T 
Vattenfall Sweden 10 2001-2010 G&T until 2009, then G 
BKW Switzerland 11 2000-2010 G&T 
Energiedienst Switzerland 7 2004-2010 G&T 
Drax Group United Kingdom 8 2003-2010 G 
National Grid United Kingdom 11 2000-2010  T 
Total  242
Notes: Obs. Is observations; G&T represents an integrated utility, G is stand-alone generation, 
T is stand-alone transmission. 
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Table A2. Magnitude of economies of vertical integration (EVI) 
Panel A. EVI based on Model i (excl. FE) 
Transmission 50th %ile: 60th %ile: 70th %ile: 80th %ile: 90th %ile: 
Generation GWh \ Km 658 3,657 6,713 11,000 33,580 
20th %ile: 2,569 17.7% *** 20.5% *** 23.9% *** 30.0% *** 96.3% ** 
30th %ile: 6,503 17.0% *** 19.8% *** 23.2% *** 29.3% *** 89.2% *** 
40th %ile: 12,869 16.0% *** 18.8% *** 22.2% *** 28.2% *** 81.5% *** 
50th %ile: 29,885 13.8% *** 16.6% *** 20.0% *** 25.8% *** 70.2% *** 
60th %ile: 52,100 11.6% *** 14.5% *** 17.9% *** 23.5% *** 62.7% *** 
70th %ile: 62,126 10.8% *** 13.7% *** 17.1% *** 22.7% *** 60.3% *** 
80th %ile: 90,785 8.9% *** 11.9% *** 15.3% *** 20.7% *** 55.2% *** 
90th %ile: 179,000 5.6% *** 8.6% *** 11.8% *** 16.7% *** 45.5% *** 
Panel B. EVI based on Model ii (incl. time FE) 
Transmission 50th %ile: 60th %ile: 70th %ile: 80th %ile: 90th %ile: 
Generation GWh \ Km 658 3,657 6,713 11,000 33,580 
20th %ile: 2,569 17.7% *** 20.5% *** 23.9% *** 30.0% *** 96.3% ** 
30th %ile: 6,503 17.0% *** 19.8% *** 23.2% *** 29.3% *** 89.2% *** 
40th %ile: 12,869 16.0% *** 18.8% *** 22.2% *** 28.2% *** 81.5% *** 
50th %ile: 29,885 13.8% *** 16.6% *** 20.0% *** 25.8% *** 70.2% *** 
60th %ile: 52,100 11.6% *** 14.5% *** 17.9% *** 23.5% *** 62.7% *** 
70th %ile: 62,126 10.8% *** 13.7% *** 17.1% *** 22.7% *** 60.3% *** 
80th %ile: 90,785 8.9% *** 11.9% *** 15.3% *** 20.7% *** 55.2% *** 
90th %ile: 179,000 5.6% *** 8.6% *** 11.8% *** 16.7% *** 45.5% *** 
Panel C. EVI based on Model iii (incl. country FE) 
Transmission 50th %ile: 60th %ile: 70th %ile: 80th %ile: 90th %ile: 
Generation GWh \ Km 658 3,657 6,713 11,000 33,580 
20th %ile: 2,569 19.5% *** 21.1% *** 23.0% *** 26.0% *** 52.3% *** 
30th %ile: 6,503 18.7% *** 20.3% *** 22.3% *** 25.3% *** 51.2% *** 
40th %ile: 12,869 17.5% *** 19.2% *** 21.2% *** 24.3% *** 49.9% *** 
50th %ile: 29,885 15.0% *** 16.9% *** 19.1% *** 22.4% *** 47.6% *** 
60th %ile: 52,100 12.7% ** 14.8% *** 17.2% *** 20.8% ** 46.1% ** 
70th %ile: 62,126 11.9% ** 14.1% ** 16.5% ** 20.2% ** 45.6% ** 
80th %ile: 90,785 10.1% ** 12.5% ** 15.1% ** 19.0% ** 44.8% ** 
90th %ile: 179,000 7.1% ** 9.8% ** 12.8% ** 17.2% ** 43.9% ** 
Notes: Calculation of EVI is based on Model iv, including time and country fixed effects. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Values below the 20th percentile of generation and 
50th percentile of transmission are not reported because outputs have values of zero. Cells in grey indicate 
output combinations at equal percentiles.  
 
